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VAT without any exemptions or zero-rating is regressive. Since the inception of 
VAT in South Africa, there has been an ongoing debate around the issue of zero-
rating to alleviate the burden on poor households. This paper uses vegetables as 
an example and conducts tax incidence analyses to compare the relative burden 
of VAT on vegetables for various income groups. It finds that differential 
treatment of the zero-rating of VAT on various categories of vegetables could be 
beneficial in terms of relative equity gains. It is suggested frozen vegetables 
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1.  INTRODUCTION 
 
Value Added Tax (VAT) is at present the second most important source of government revenue 
in South Africa, but as in most countries around the world, its impact on income distribution is 
controversial. A VAT applied without any exemptions or zero-rating is regressive. Given the 
country's political history and the extremely skewed distribution of income and wealth, the 
impact of the tax is even more controversial in South Africa. The mere fact that the rate has been 
unchanged at 14% since 1993 indicates that the tax is perceived as unfair, which is also clear from 
the strong resistance by the Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU) against any 
suggestions to increase the flat rate.  
 
Since the inception of VAT in 1991, the economic incidence of the tax was questioned and 
subsequently some additional foodstuffs were zero-rated, after continuous protests particularly 
from the labour unions. Furthermore, over the years various studies, the majority of which were 
commissioned by the South African government, investigated the redistributive consequences of 
VAT and confirmed its regressive impact.1 The variety of studies is indicative of the fact that the 
impact of VAT on poor households is a politically sensitive and very emotional issue, which is 
understandable given the extent of poverty and inequality.   
 
Given increasing domestic and international food prices, especially since the first half of 2008, 
and the fact that food prices were a major factor behind the increasing rate of inflation in South 
Africa at that time2, media reports increasingly focused on the plight of the poor and renewed 
questions were raised about the regressive impact of VAT on poor households. There was also 
speculation in the media at that time that the South African government was considering the 
zero-rating of some additional foodstuffs. Ensor (2008) reported that chicken, sorghum products 
and baby products were some of the items under consideration for possible additional zero-
rating. The government however soon afterwards rejected this possibility (claiming that the rich 
would gain substantially more from zero-rating than the poor).    
 
This paper relates to these concerns about the impact of VAT on poor households. It is certainly 
not an easy task to target the poor effectively, given that expenditure patterns are intricate and 
change over time. It should also be kept in mind that the distributional impact of a single tax 
should not be judged in isolation, but rather be considered as part of the whole tax structure.  
Moreover, it is total fiscal incidence that really matters and it is generally accepted that the 
expenditure side of the national budget instead of taxes is a more efficient instrument to cater for 
the needs of the poor. However, this paper argues that the targeting of the zero-rated basket can 
be improved to enhance possible equity gains. 
 
The paper investigates the current zero-rating of vegetables as a food category as a case study and 
suggests that small changes to the tax treatment of sub-categories could have a more direct 
impact on the cost of food for the poor and enhance the equity gain from zero-rating. The first 
part of the paper focuses on the findings of various studies over the years on the distributional 
impact of the tax in South Africa. This is followed by some descriptive statistics illustrating the 
most recent expenditure patterns on vegetables of households across different income groups. 
Thereafter, using a partial equilibrium approach to tax incidence analyses (and different 
methodologies), the distributional impact of VAT on different categories of vegetables is 
illustrated in an attempt to motivate the proposed changes to the zero-rated basket of basic 
foodstuffs. The final section concludes and makes some recommendations. 
 
                                                     
1 Hardly any of the findings and recommendations of these studies translated into policy adjustments. 
2 Food price inflation is again a major factor, as indicated by the fact that it increased from 11.1% in November to 
11.6% in December 2011 (South African Reserve Bank, 2012). 
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2.  THE QUEST TO MAKE VAT LESS REGRESSIVE IN SOUTH AFRICA 
 
Since the introduction of the general sales tax (GST) on 3 July 1978 the distributional 
consequences of this first broad-based sales tax in South Africa were under scrutiny, especially 
from the side of COSATU. This was during a period when the struggle against apartheid 
escalated and the tax was regarded as just another ‘instrument of discrimination’. This culminated 
in the first zero-rating of basic foodstuffs on 1 July 1984 (Stoltz, 1987:95 - 96). However, already 
in 1985 Tait (as discussed in Stoltz (1987)) speculated that the zero-rating would not succeed in 
relieving the pressure from the poorer households as much as expected. He blamed this on the 
specific classification of the type of foodstuffs that were targeted. Stoltz (1987) cited the 
examples of dried beans, canned food and vegetable oil, products which were not zero-rated, 
despite being generally regarded as “basic”.  
 
Smit (1986), in an unpublished study for the Margo Commission, used a social accounting matrix 
and estimated the tax burden of direct as well as indirect taxes for 1985 (Fourie and Owen, 1993). 
He based his calculations on a GST rate of 12% and found that the burden of this tax ranged 
“…from approximately 8.5 per cent of per capita household income for the poorest groups to 
approximately 4.5 per cent for the richest groups” (Fourie and Owen, 1993:308). This clearly 
indicates the regressive impact of the tax. 
 
In September 1991 a consumption-type of value added tax (VAT) was introduced at a rate of 
10% to replace the GST, mainly for its revenue-raising potential and self-policing feature.3 In 
1993 the rate was increased to 14%. Right from the start there were concerns about the 
regressive impact of the tax and as a result additional selected basic foodstuffs, such as maize 
meal, milk, fruit and vegetables as well as paraffin were zero-rated over time.4 As mentioned 
earlier, various studies in subsequent years focused on the distributional impact of the tax. The 
following paragraphs present the main findings of some of the studies chronologically.  
 
Fourie and Owen (1993: 313) determined that one-third of the total revenue loss as a result of 
zero-rating went to households from the poorest three income groups (out of nine groups 
identified). Despite this, they concluded that zero-rating significantly reduced the tax-burden on 
the lower-income households. Although the rich logically gained more in absolute terms, because 
they spent more, it is the relative burden of the tax which really matters when the regressive 
impact of VAT is considered. Fourie and Owen (1993: 308) furthermore warned: “An increased 
reliance on such a tax could have significant implications for economic justice and poverty, with 
obvious political ramifications.” 
 
The Katz Commission in its First Interim Report (1994) commented on the possibility of 
introducing a higher VAT rate on selected luxury goods to mitigate the regressive impact of the 
tax, but then found that the effect would be “minimal”. The Commission claimed that an 
“extensive set of luxury goods” and also much higher rates would be required to achieve a 
meaningful reduction in regressivity. The Commission therefore rejected the introduction of a 
higher VAT rate on luxury goods, but recommended that targeted poverty relief should be 
considered instead. It is significant that the Commission (1994: 123) furthermore claimed that 
“… it might be possible, based on equity considerations, to improve on the present basket of 
zero-rated goods” and also recommended that “…the revenue authorities should from time to 
time systematically review the current basket of zero-rated goods, with reference, inter alia, to the 
distributional aspects.”  
                                                     
3 The GST system suffered from serious evasion, since all tax was collected at the end of the distribution chain. 
4 Cnossen (2003: 6) gives a complete list of the zero-rated food items: “… brown bread, maize meal, samp, mealie 
rice, dried mealies, dried beans, lentils, pilchards/sardinella in tins, milk powder, dairy powder blend, rice, vegetables, 
fruit, vegetable oil, milk, cultured milk, brown weaten meal, eggs, edible legumes and pulses of leguminous plants.” 




Alderman and Del Ninno (1999) in a study for the World Bank on the targeting of the current 
and proposed zero-rating at that stage, concluded that the zero-rating of fluid milk (which was 
zero-rated) and meat (for which zero-rating was proposed) could not be justified in terms of 
equity, neither in terms of its nutritional value. Another interesting finding was that the zero-
rating of meat would benefit non-poor urban households relatively more and negatively impact 
on the calorie intake of rural households. In contrast they found that the zero-rating of maize was 
well targeted. Their study confirmed the importance not only of proper targeting, but also of the 
need to consider individual items for zero-rating. What is relevant for the purpose of this paper is 
that this study at that stage already looked at a sub-category (fluid milk) and also proposed that 
canned vegetables should be zero-rated.  
 
Over the years COSATU as important interest group continually urged government to ensure 
that VAT is not applied to basic foodstuffs. For example, in a submission to the Portfolio 
Committee on Finance (1999) the union federation explicitly stated: “The absence of an effective 
social security system exacerbates the regressivity of VAT and strengthens the case for zero rating 
VAT on many basic goods and services.” The union based its argument on the objectives of the 
RDP and also the elections manifesto of the ANC which stated: “There will be special tax 
exemption on those basic goods which poor families rely upon for survival.” In its submission 
(1999:3) the union federation furthermore suggested that government should consider zero-
rating “…particular tinned foods which are consumed by low income groups” and also claimed 
that government’s proposals were not based on “…any study or statistical analysis of 
consumption patterns of the poor.” The union federation also regarded the proposal of the Draft 
Revenue Laws Amendment Bill to remove the zero-rating in the case of frozen vegetables as 
“arbitrary…” Watkinson and Makgetla (2002), in a study for the National Labour and Economic 
Development Institute (NALEDI), also referred to COSATU’s additional concerns that the zero-
rating of VAT on basic foodstuffs was not being passed on to consumers. The union federation 
specifically mentioned zero-rating anomalies in the retail price of bread and pointed out that, 
except for the 700gm brown loaf, brown bread was generally more expensive than white (but 
brown bread was zero-rated, whilst white bread was not).5  
 
Calcaterra and Kirsten (2003:4-12) in a study for the meat industry assessed the possible zero-
rating of red meat and showed how the tax distorted consumer choices (due to the income and 
substitution effects). They found that poorer households substituted meat (which was more 
expensive as a result of the tax) for grain products. They also found that the budget share spent 
on fruit and vegetables decreased as real income decreased.  This is interesting as it suggests that 
the broad categories of fruit and vegetables may be regarded as normal products, whilst the 
ensuing analysis shows that when vegetables are divided into sub-categories, a different picture 
emerges. Their findings also indicated that the introduction of VAT resulted in retail price 
increases (for the period 1991-1992) that exceeded the inflation rate and that it was most evident 
for beef, pork and mutton. They furthermore recommended that the impact on prices should be 
monitored in order to make sure that it is the consumer and not the producer or retailer who 
really benefits from the rather costly exercise.   
    
Cnossen (2003:11-12), an internationally acclaimed tax expert, investigated the incidence of 
consumption taxes in SADC countries. Whilst acknowledging that exemption6 was a widely used 
approach to mitigate the regressive impact of VAT in developing countries, he explicitly referred 
to differential rating as a second-best instrument. However, he claimed that “…using the income 
tax to address regressivity does not help the really poor who are not subject to this tax. 
                                                     
5 They used data from Statistics South Africa on Consumer Product Prices, October 2001. 
6 Studies often use the terms exemption and zero-rating interchangeably. Cnossen (2003:13), however, prefers the term 
exemption to zero-rating, because he believes it would be “…a greater deterrent to political pressures to increase the 
number of favoured products.”  
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Accordingly, there is a residual case for exemption…” What is particularly interesting was his 
comment that policy makers in SADC countries should consider the type of basic foodstuffs that 
were zero-rated in South Africa as an example to improve the distributional impact of VAT. He 
therefore by implication acknowledged that zero-rating was an effective tool to address the equity 
concerns of VAT in South Africa. What is furthermore important for policy makers was 
Cnossen's recommendation (2003:3) that the “… efficacy of rate- and base-differentiated...” 
consumption taxes should be regularly examined. 
 
Delfin, Kearny, Robinson and Thierfelder (2005) used a computable general equilibrium (CGE) 
model to determine the distributional implications of possible reforms to VAT in South Africa. 
They considered what the effect would be of replacing the VAT on agriculture and food with, 
amongst other things, an increase of other VAT rates. They explained that there was room for 
changes to the VAT system that would make the incidence of the tax less regressive and explicitly 
stated (2003:19): “Minor changes to the tax structure can have a substantial impact on the tax 
burden for low-income households.” This is exactly what this paper intends to demonstrate. 
Delfin et al. (2003:6) furthermore claimed that the intended benefit from the zero-rating of 
paraffin in 2001 was not passed on to consumers, but absorbed by suppliers.7 
 
Price Waterhouse Coopers (2007) was commissioned by National Treasury to investigate zero-
rating specific merit goods, such as education and health services.  Part of the directive was to 
determine the possible impact of the zero-rating of individual items, such as specific types of 
meat and fruit (oranges). The findings of this study was presented at a National Tax Symposium 
in 2008, but unfortunately have not been made available. An unofficial discussion (12 July 2009) 
with a senior office-bearer of the firm revealed that the recommendations of the report were not 
considered by National Treasury, due to an explicit policy decision at that time against any 
further zero-rating (in order to protect the tax base). Furthermore, it was mentioned that the 
South African Canned Fruit and Vegetable Industry was also putting pressure on government to 
zero-rate canned foodstuffs. This is significant for the purpose of this paper. 
 
It therefore came as no surprise when the Minister of Finance, in the 2008 Medium Term Budget 
Policy Statement (Republic of South Africa, 2008:42), made it clear that despite pressure, no 
further foodstuffs would be zero-rated and explicitly stated:  “Evidence suggests that existing 
VAT zero-ratings and exemptions, in almost all cases confer substantially more benefits on 
middle- and higher-income groups than on lower-income groups”.8 It is particularly this 
statement that this paper is investigating, by focusing on the meaning of ‘substantially more 
benefits’. Whilst it is obvious that higher income groups gain more from zero-rating in absolute 
terms because they spend larger amounts, poorer households gain more in relative terms. This 
statement by government therefore contrasts the findings of Fourie and Owen (1993) as well as 
the statement by Cnossen (2003) regarding the efficacy of zero-rating in mitigating the regressive 
impact of VAT.  
 
Moreover, in the recent past and over various budget years, the South African government 
significantly reduced the tax burden on low and middle income-earners through changes to the 
individual income tax structure.9 However, these efforts exacerbated the real and perceived 
inequity of the tax system as the efforts did not reach the poorest of households who are not 
liable for income tax. It is noteworthy that Fourie and Owen (1993) opposed the argument that 
                                                     
7 Although outside the main focus of this paper, this matter should concern policy makers, as it was also raised by 
COSATU and mentioned in the study by Calcaterra and Kirsten (2003). 
8 The minister also claimed that “…producers and suppliers may capture a large percentage of the benefit of VAT 
zero-rating.” (Republic of South Africa, 2008). This statement proves that government was aware of the concerns 
raised by Alderman and Del Ninno (1999), COSATU (1999) and Calcaterra and Kirsten (2003). 
9 The South African government granted income tax relief of R63417 million over the budget years 2004-05 to 2009-
10 (National Treasury & South African Revenue Service, 2010). None of this reached the really poor. 
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regressivity can best be addressed by changes to the income tax structure. Cnossen (2003:12) also 
agreed that it “…does not help the really poor.” 
 
Despite efficiency arguments against the narrowing of the VAT base through exemptions and 
zero-rating, it is not a policy that will easily disappear. Bird (2008:12) claimed that “…a country 
may of course decide that the price is worth paying. After all, fairness is a key issue in designing 
any tax regime.” Fourie and Owen (1993) mentioned that recommendations to reduce or 
eliminate zero-rating were rarely followed in practice and stated that, apart from the fact that it 
would not be politically responsible in the South African context, it could not be implemented as 
long as the social security system was not effective. This argument still holds as Van der Berg 
(2009), in a study on the fiscal incidence of social spending in 2006, indicates that even though 
social spending on the poor has increased, it can only have a limited impact in addressing the 
large degree of inequality. It can therefore be expected that zero-rating of VAT will remain part 
and parcel of the structure of VAT in South Africa. 
 
However, certain anomalies are part of the present system of zero-rating. A particular case in 
point is the category of vegetables, which can be broken down into different sub-categories. 
Canned vegetables, mostly consumed by relatively poorer households, are not included in the 
zero-rated basket. In contrast, relatively luxurious unprocessed fresh vegetables (for example 
fresh asparagus and mushrooms) are mostly consumed by relatively richer households, but are 
zero-rated. The next section of the paper therefore investigates the tax treatment of specific sub-
categories of vegetables as an illustrative example of changes that can be made to the zero-rated 
basket of basic foodstuffs, which may enhance the equity gain from this costly exercise (in terms 
of loss of tax revenue). 
 
3.  INVESTIGATING THE TAX TREATMENT OF THE FOOD CATEGORY OF 
VEGETABLES 
 
Firstly, this section defines basic foodstuffs, followed by an explanation of the data used in the 
subsequent analyses. The analyses commence with an investigation of the expenditure patterns of 
various income groups on different categories of vegetables. Thereafter tax incidence analyses 
focuses on the equity impact of VAT on different categories of vegetables. The findings are 
complemented by concentration curves analyses and some indicators of inequality. 
 
3.1  Defining basic foodstuffs 
 
It is not easy to select which basic foodstuffs should be considered for possible zero-rating from 
VAT (Fourie and Owen 1993). According to Cnossen (in Khalilzadeh-Shirazi and Shah, 1991: 
81), the definition of essential goods tends to differ between countries. Tait (1988) distinguished 
between essential and luxury goods in an attempt to reduce the erosion of the tax base when 
zero-rating is applied. According to him it basically relates to a distinction between processed and 
unprocessed food. Calcaterra and Kirsten (2003:2) on the other hand, distinguished between 
basic foods when referring to products that undergo minimal processing, and staple foods that 
are traditionally linked to the diets of households in poor communities.  
 
Given that equity is the main concern, it stands to reason that the equity gain to the poor should 
be maximised (Fourie and Owen, 1993). Their main consideration in this regard is whether the 
goods are disproportionately consumed by the poor, and whether it is a crucial part of poor 
household's budgets. This is in agreement with Cnossen (2003:11), who suggested the following 
guidelines for rate differentiation: (a) necessities should have an income elasticity of demand of 
less than one and a price inelastic demand; (b) it should be possible to divide goods into sub-
groups, assuming that spending patterns between the poor and the rich are distinctly different. As 
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such, goods that ought to be considered for zero-rating would be those consumed 
proportionately more by the poor.    
 
3.2  Data and analyses 
 
The study used data from the Income and Expenditure Survey 2005/2006 (IES 2005/2006), as 
released by Statistics South Africa (2008). This data include households throughout the country 
and provides comprehensive information on their expenditure patterns. The population is 
divided into quintiles, ranging from the poorest 20% of households (quintile1) to the richest 20% 
(quintile5), based on real per capita income.  
 
The analyses have three components. Firstly, household spending patterns on different categories 
of vegetables are analysed to determine which types of vegetables are disproportionately 
consumed by the poorest households. Secondly, average tax rates are determined for different 
categories of vegetables across income groups to investigate the incidence of VAT between 
income groups. Alternative zero-rating options to maximise the equity gain are then considered.  
Tax concentration curves provide further empirical evidence in support of the findings from the 
incidence analysis. Some indicators measuring the relative tax burden on the poor are finally 
calculated, which also reflects the degree of regressivity of the tax.  
 
3.3  Spending on vegetables 
 
This section focuses on spending patterns of households on vegetables across the income 
distribution spectrum in South Africa. The focus is particularly on the sub-categories of fresh, 
frozen and canned vegetables. Some of these sub-categories are considered as basic and are 
currently zero-rated, whilst others are not. 
 
3.3.1  All categories of vegetables 
 
Table 1 provides a summary of household spending on vegetables by quintile. It is evident that in 
absolute terms quintile1 spent a smaller amount on vegetables and fruit than the richest. 
However, for equity purposes it is more relevant to compare spending as percentage of income. 
Considering spending on these items as percentage of household income, quintile1 spent a larger 
percentage (7.66%), as compared to quintile5 who spent only 0.50% of their income on 
vegetables. This shows that vegetables are relatively more important for poorer households and 
may explain the inclusion of some of the sub-categories in the zero-rated basket.  
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Table 1: Household spending on vegetables 






vegetables as a 




vegetables as a 
% of total 
income 
Quintile1 1356 12.76% 7.66% 
Quintile2 1322 11.07% 3.87% 
Quintile3 1222 10.11% 2.27% 
Quintile4 1276 09.32% 1.22% 
Quintile5 2131 09.36% 0.50% 
All 7306 10.27% 1.14% 
Source: Own calculations. Data from IES 2005/2006, Statistics South Africa, 2008. 
 
However, when focusing on the different sub-categories of vegetables (canned, frozen and fresh), 
a different picture emerges. This is the focus of the following sub-sections. 
 
3.3.2  Canned and frozen vegetables 
 
Since canned vegetables are currently not included in the zero-rated basket, whereas frozen 
vegetables are, it is interesting to investigate spending on these two sub-categories of vegetables 
across the income groups. Figure 1 illustrates the spending patterns (by quintile) on canned and 
frozen vegetables as percentage of income. It is evident that quintile1 spent the largest percentage 
(0.339%) on canned vegetables, in contrast to quintile5 that spent only 0.049% of their income 
on canned vegetables. This shows that spending patterns on canned vegetables as percentage of 
income are distinctly different between the income groups.  
 
In the case of frozen vegetables the same pattern emerges. Figure 1 reflects that the poorest 
households spent a larger percentage of their income on frozen vegetables (0,214%), as 
compared to the richest households (who only spent 0.041%). 
 










Canned vegetables 0.339% 0.196% 0.179% 0.119% 0.049% 0.087%
Frozen vegetables 0.214% 0.131% 0.106% 0.083% 0.041% 0.063%
Quintile1 Quintile2 Quintile3 Quintile4 Quintile5 All
 
Source: Own calculations. Data from IES 2005/2006, Statistics South Africa, 2008. 
 
This result is contrary to expectations since it is often assumed that poor households own fewer 
or no refrigeration facilities. A further investigation of the IES 2005/2006 data however reveals a 
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possible explanation. As illustrated in Table 2, almost 40% of households in quintile1 own or 
have access to either a refrigerator or a freezer.   
 




1 2 3 4 5 
Owns 35.84% 51.96% 57.44% 66.87% 87.53% 
Does not own but has access  03.31% 02.87% 04.81% 05.80% 02.29% 
Does not own and no access 60.66% 45.12% 37.63% 27.33% 10.06% 
Unspecified 00.19% 00.05% 00.12% 00.00% 00.12% 
Source: Own calculations. Data from IES 2005/2006, Statistics South Africa, 2008. 
 
To a certain extent this provides an explanation for the relative spending patterns shown in 
Figure 1. Perhaps it is more likely that this applies mostly to poor households in urban areas10 
(where many may have refrigeration facilities), which then would imply that the zero-rating of 
frozen vegetables benefited urban households relatively more, thus negatively affecting the 
relative position of rural households, where poverty is at its most severe. This is similar to the 
finding of Alderman and Del Ninno (1999) regarding the possible zero-rating of red meat. 
 
3.3.3  Fresh vegetables 
 
Another sub-category is fresh vegetables. From Figure 2 it is evident that the poorest households 
spent the greatest percentage of their income on fresh vegetables (5.66%) when compared to 
richest households, who only spent 0.29% of their income. 
 













Quintile1 Quintile2 Quintile3 Quintile4 Quintile5 All
 
Source: Own calculations. Data from IES 2005/2006, Statistics South Africa, 2008. 
 
Given this finding, the zero-rating of the fresh vegetable category seems logical, but a different 
picture emerges when considering sub-categories of fresh vegetables. 
  
The IES 2005/2006 provides information on the spending patterns of households for 22 
different types of fresh vegetables. Using spending patterns identified over income groups, it 
suggests that fresh vegetables can be sub-divided into two groups, namely a “basic” category and 
“other” (more “luxurious” vegetables) category. The definition of “basic” fresh vegetables used 
here is based on spending patterns identified in Table 3. From these spending patterns a 
                                                     
10 The percentage of households residing in urban areas in quintiles 1 and 2 were 40% and 50% respectively.  
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distinction is made between “basic” and “other” fresh vegetables. Although it would be more 
appropriate to refer to the latter category as “luxurious” fresh vegetable foodstuffs, the share 
spent on these items do not necessarily increase proportionally more than the income share.11  
The allocation to the “basic” category is based on the spending by quintile (as a percentage of 
income). If spending as a percentage of income on an individual item decreases across quintiles, it 
is classified as a “basic” item (see Table A.1 in the appendix for the classification all vegetable 
items). Based on this analysis, Table 3 shows spending patterns of the two sub-categories.   
 
 
                                                     
11 According to the definition of luxury goods, spending should increase proportionally more than income 
(Nicholson, 1998). 
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Table 3: Spending on individual items of fresh vegetables 
“Basic” fresh vegetables 
Spending (Rand million) per quintile Spending as percentage of income per quintile 
Quintile1 Quintile2 Quintile3 Quintile4 Quintile5 Quintile1 Quintile2 Quintile3 Quintile4 Quintile5 
Fresh spinach/morogo 100 44 27 25 25 0.567% 0.128% 0.050% 0.024% 0.006% 
Fresh cabbage 134 120 84 58 31 0.757% 0.351% 0.156% 0.056% 0.007% 
Fresh green mealies 41 27 12 5 10 0.233% 0.078% 0.022% 0.005% 0.002% 
Fresh tomatoes 152 163 150 157 183 0.860% 0.478% 0.278% 0.150% 0.043% 
Fresh green beans 6 5 6 10 21 0.033% 0.014% 0.011% 0.010% 0.005% 
Fresh pumpkin/butternut 33 37 31 36 51 0.184% 0.109% 0.058% 0.035% 0.012% 
Fresh green/red/yellow pepper 11 11 18 23 86 0.063% 0.032% 0.033% 0.022% 0.020% 
Fresh chillies 1 1 2 3 5 0.007% 0.004% 0.004% 0.003% 0.001% 
Fresh mixed vegetables 25 33 40 34 55 0.139% 0.098% 0.074% 0.033% 0.013% 
Onions 88 96 96 104 103 0.499% 0.282% 0.178% 0.100% 0.024% 
Fresh carrots 16 22 30 39 58 0.092% 0.065% 0.055% 0.037% 0.014% 
Beetroot 13 18 18 17 15 0.074% 0.053% 0.034% 0.016% 0.004% 
Potatoes 357 362 301 251 241 2.019% 1.062% 0.558% 0.240% 0.056% 
Sweet potatoes 15 23 26 35 81 0.086% 0.068% 0.048% 0.033% 0.019% 
  993 963 840 799 965 5.612% 2.820% 1.558% 0.764% 0.225% 
“Other” fresh vegetables 
Spending (Rand million) per quintile Spending as percentage of income per quintile 
Quintile1 Quintile2 Quintile3 Quintile4 Quintile5 Quintile1 Quintile2 Quintile3 Quintile4 Quintile5 
Lettuce 3 4 9 19 68 0.015% 0.011% 0.016% 0.018% 0.016% 
Fresh cauliflower 1 2 1 5 18 0.006% 0.006% 0.003% 0.005% 0.004% 
Fresh broccoli 0 0 1 2 24 0.001% 0.001% 0.003% 0.002% 0.006% 
Fresh marrow 0 0 0 3 19 0.001% 0.000% 0.001% 0.002% 0.004% 
Fresh gem squashes 1 1 3 5 21 0.007% 0.003% 0.006% 0.005% 0.005% 
Fresh cucumber 2 2 5 15 57 0.010% 0.006% 0.009% 0.014% 0.013% 
Other fresh vegetables 0 0 1 1 7 0.001% 0.001% 0.001% 0.001% 0.002% 
Mushrooms 0 1 3 12 77 0.002% 0.003% 0.006% 0.011% 0.018% 
  8 11 24 61 291 0.044% 0.031% 0.045% 0.058% 0.068% 
Source: Own calculations. Data from IES 2005/2006, Statistics South Africa, 2008. 
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It is evident that there were certain items within the fresh vegetable category on which the 
poorest households spent very little, or which they did not buy at all. Spending on these items as 
a percentage of income clearly increased as income increased. Examples included broccoli, 
marrow and mushrooms.12  
 
Figure 3 illustrates the spending on “basic” fresh vegetables as a percentage of income. It is 
evident that the poorest households spent a greater percentage of their income on “basic” 
vegetables (they spent 5.61% of their income, as opposed to only 0.23% by the richest groups). 
 































Other fresh vegetables 0.044% 0.031% 0.045% 0.058% 0.068% 0.062%
Basic fresh vegetables 5.612% 2.820% 1.558% 0.764% 0.225% 0.714%
Quintile1 Quintile2 Quintile3 Quintile4 Quintile5 All
 
Source: Own calculations. Data from IES 2005/2006, Statistics South Africa, 2008. 
 
This section began with an investigation into the spending patterns of households across income 
groups on the various categories of vegetables (i.e. canned, frozen and fresh vegetables). The 
main finding is that poor households spend relatively more on canned, frozen, and basic fresh 
vegetables as percentage of income, which indicates that these sub-categories are suitable for 
zero-rating. 
 
3.4  Alternative targeting of zero-rating to enhance equity gains 
 
Considering the findings from the previous section, it is crucial to investigate the tax treatment 
(in terms of zero-rating) of the vegetables category and of specific sub-categories. As mentioned, 
currently canned vegetables are not zero-rated and this section commences with an analysis of 
the tax incidence of VAT on canned vegetables. More important is the question of how the 
incidence of a simulated VAT on frozen vegetables would compare with that of canned 
vegetables. A further investigation considers the possibility of alternative targeting within sub-
categories. This will explore how the spending patterns on different types of fresh vegetables (as 
analysed earlier) can be used to suggest alternative zero-rating within a specific food category, by 
                                                     
12 The IES 2005/2006 does not provide a comprehensive list of all vegetables. It is therefore possible that other 
individual items may be identified on which poorer households spend a relatively smaller percentage of their income.  
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once again analysing the incidence of a simulated VAT. Finally, an indicator measuring the degree 
of the tax burden is calculated. This is done to emphasize the empirical findings of the tax 
incidence analyses. 
 
The subsequent analysis follows a partial and static equilibrium approach13, since the focus is only 
on VAT, while neither secondary effects nor price changes are considered. Conventional tax 
theory defines tax regressivity (or progressivity) in terms of the average tax rate. Rosen and Gayer 
(2008: 307) explain that if the average tax rate decreases (increases) with income, the tax is 
regressive (progressive). Johannes, Nju and Theresia (2006: 11) provide the following formula to 
















Where t = ad valorem tax rate, e = amount of spending (inclusive of the VAT amount paid), as 
reported in the household survey. 
 
Using this formula and the IES 2005/2006 data, the VAT paid by income group for different 
categories of vegetables is determined, and explained in the following sub-section.  
 
3.4.1 Incidence of VAT on canned vegetables 
 
Figure 4 shows the absolute amounts of VAT paid on canned vegetables. It is evident that the 
richest households pay the largest amount of VAT in absolute terms. Figure 4, however, also 
shows that when considering VAT on canned vegetables as a percentage of income, it is 
regressive, as the poorest households pays a greater percentage of their income on VAT, as 
compared to the richest households. Given this finding, it can be concluded that the impact of 
the tax on canned vegetables is regressive. This implies that canned vegetables should have been 
included in the zero-rated basket and explains the rationale behind the earlier demands of the 
labour union federation as well as the recommendations by Alderman and Del Ninno (1999).  
 
                                                     
13 According to Rosen and Gayer (2008:307), tax incidence can be conducted using different techniques, for example 
analysing the distributional impact of replacing one tax with another while keeping tax revenue constant (referred to 
as differential tax incidence).  
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 as percentage of incom
e
VAT as percentage of income 0.042% 0.024% 0.022% 0.015% 0.006%
VAT amount paid 7 8 12 15 26
Quintile1 Quintile2 Quintile3 Quintile4 Quintile5
 
Source: Own calculations. Data from IES 2005/2006, Statistics South Africa, 2008. 
 
3.4.2 Comparing the incidence of VAT on canned and frozen vegetables 
 
This section compares the VAT paid on canned vegetables as it is currently applied, to the VAT 
consumers would have to pay if zero-rating is removed from frozen vegetables. To compare the 
VAT currently paid on canned vegetables to what households would be paying if zero-rating is 
removed from frozen vegetables, involves making some assumptions about the price elasticity of 
demand for frozen vegetables. According to Alderman and Del Ninno (1999: 193), the price 
elasticity of demand for fruit and vegetables is -0.82, and for this study, it is assumed that the 
price elasticity of demand for vegetables is relatively inelastic. Therefore, if prices were to increase 
due to the imposition of VAT, overall spending on frozen vegetables would increase, despite the 
decline in volumes bought. Since the price elasticity of demand is less than one (i.e. price 
inelastic), a proportional increase in price will lead to a smaller proportional decrease in the 
quantity bought, hence there will be an increase in total expenditure. Due to insufficient 
information on the price elasticity of demand for different types of vegetables, it is assumed that 
total spending will remain unchanged in the event of price changes.  
 
The VAT paid after imposing a rate of 14% on frozen vegetable spending is indicated in Figure 
5. When considering VAT paid on frozen vegetables as a percentage of income, the figure shows 
that a relatively larger tax burden will fall on the poorest households. Quintile1 pays 0.030% of 
their income in terms of VAT on frozen vegetables, whereas quintile5 only pay 0.006%.  It is 
therefore evident that VAT on frozen vegetables would be regressive and that the zero-rating of 
frozen vegetables thus enhances equity. 
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 as percentage of incom
e
VAT as percentage of income 0.030% 0.018% 0.015% 0.012% 0.006%
VAT amount paid 5 6 8 12 24
Quintile1 Quintile2 Quintile3 Quintile4 Quintile5
 
Source: Own calculations. Data from IES 2005/2006, Statistics South Africa, 2008. 
 
A comparison of the relative shares of VAT paid on canned and frozen vegetables indicates that 
VAT on canned vegetables is more regressive than it would be if VAT is applied to frozen 
vegetables. This finding has important implications for the zero-rating of VAT as it is currently 
applied to the vegetables food category. In the case of frozen vegetables, the analysis indicates 
that zero-rating is well targeted since the poor would pay a higher percentage of their income on 
VAT (should frozen vegetables be taxed at the standard rate). In contrast, however, not zero-
rating canned vegetables affects poor households relatively more than rich households. The 
former group pays a greater percentage of their income towards VAT on canned vegetables, 
when compared to the latter group. It therefore seems reasonable to propose that the zero-rating 
of VAT should also be applied to canned vegetables.  
 
3.4.3 Analysing the zero-rating of fresh vegetables  
 
As mentioned earlier, fresh vegetables are zero-rated. This section explores the possibility of 
improving the equity gain from the tax treatment of fresh vegetables, using the earlier distinction 
between “basic” and “other” fresh vegetables (as discussed in Section 3.3). Given the earlier 
comparison of spending on “basic” and “other” fresh vegetables (see Figure 3), the rich spends 
proportionally more on “other” fresh vegetables than the poorest households. This indicates that 
there is room for sub-dividing food groups into different sub-categories, which can be taxed at 
different rates in order to influence the distributional impact of VAT. This conforms to one of 
Cnossen’s (2003) guidelines mentioned earlier, referring to the possibility of dividing goods into 
sub-groups.  
 
To determine the tax incidence on fresh vegetables if the zero-rating of VAT were to be removed 
from fresh vegetables, a VAT rate of 14% is applied to all items in this category. Figures 6 and 7 
illustrate the VAT paid on “basic” and “other” fresh vegetables by quintile, based on the 
assumption that total spending on fresh vegetables remains unchanged. Even though there is 
insufficient information on the price elasticities for individual items of fresh vegetables, given the 
existing empirical evidence (refer to Section 3.4.2) of a relatively inelastic demand for the broad 
categories of fruit and vegetables, it is assumed that spending on fresh vegetables will not 
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necessarily decrease significantly if prices were to increase. The VAT calculation is based on the 
(unchanged) existing spending patterns as identified using the IES 2005/2006 data. 
 







































 as percentage of incom
e
VAT as percentage of income 0.786% 0.395% 0.218% 0.107% 0.032%
VAT amount paid 139 135 118 112 135
Quintile1 Quintile2 Quintile3 Quintile4 Quintile5
 
Source: Own calculations. Data from IES 2005/2006, Statistics South Africa, 2008. 
 
Figure 6 shows the amounts of VAT paid on “basic” fresh vegetables by income group. It clearly 
illustrates that if zero-rating of VAT were to be removed from this sub-category, the poor would 
be worse off. Based on spending patterns, households in quintile1 will pay R139 million in VAT, 
as compared to those in quintile5 who will pay R135 million. Figure 6 clearly shows that the 
impact of VAT on “basic” fresh vegetables will be regressive, when analysing the tax paid as a 
percentage of income. As income increases, the average tax rate decreases.  
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 as percentage of incom
e
VAT as percentage of income 0.006% 0.004% 0.006% 0.008% 0.010%
VAT amount paid 1 1 3 9 41
Quintile1 Quintile2 Quintile3 Quintile4 Quintile5
 
Source: Own calculations. Data from IES 2005/2006, Statistics South Africa, 2008. 
 
Considering the VAT paid on “other” fresh vegetables, the results in this case are contrary to the 
previous findings. Figure 7 indicates that the poorest households pay relatively less VAT on 
“other” fresh vegetables, in absolute terms. For example, households in quintile1 pay R1 million 
in VAT, while those in quintile5 who pay R41 million. 
  
This result is even more pronounced when analysing VAT paid on “other” fresh vegetables as a 
percentage of income, as shown in Figure 7. It is evident that the impact of VAT in this case is 
progressive, i.e. the average tax rate increases as income increases. This provides substantiation 
for an argument to remove zero-rating of VAT from selective “other” fresh vegetables, whilst at 
the same time maintaining the policy of zero-rating “basic” fresh vegetables.  
 
3.4.4 Revenue implications of alternative targeting 
 
A rough estimate of the tax revenue implications of these proposals is given as follows: if the 
absolute amounts of VAT paid on “other” fresh vegetables are considered, households in 
quintile5 will pay around R41 million per annum (as opposed to only R1 million per annum by 
those in quintile1). In total, government revenue will increase by approximately R55 million. 
Removing VAT from canned vegetables will, however, result in a loss of tax revenue of R68 
million in total (refer to Figure 4), which implies a loss of R13 million. It should be kept in mind 
though that the poorest quintile group will pay R7 million less VAT on canned vegetables if VAT 
is zero-rated, as compared to R26 million for the richest quintile group. Given the suggestions of 
zero-rating VAT on canned vegetables and taxing “other” fresh vegetables14, households in 
quintile1 will pay R6 million in terms of less VAT, whereas those in quintile5 will pay R15 million 
more.15 
 
                                                     
14 Refer to the last row of Figures 4 and 7 respectively. 
15 These revenue estimates may be different depending on the price elasticities. 
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3.4.5 Incidence analysis using tax concentration curves 
 
Tax concentration curves can be used as a further mechanism to assess the regressivity of VAT 
on various categories of vegetable spending. Muñoz and Sang-Wook Cho (2003:9) define the 
concentration curve as a curve that is similar to the Lorenz curve except that cumulative tax 
expenditure is plotted against the cumulative population. A comparison of the concentration 
curve to the Lorenz curve (for cumulative expenditure) provides an indication of whether the 
impact of the tax is regressive or progressive. In the case of a regressive tax, the concentration 
curve lies above the Lorenz curve and below the equality line. For a progressive tax, the 
concentration curve is below the Lorenz curve.   
 
Figure 8 compares the tax concentration curves for the vegetable categories specified in the 
earlier analyses, i.e. canned, frozen and fresh vegetables (with the latter category divided into 
“basic” and “other” fresh vegetables). 
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Line of equality Expenditure
Canned vegetables Frozen vegetables
Basic fresh vegetables Other fresh vegetables  
Source: Own calculations. Data from IES 2005/2006, Statistics South Africa, 2008. 
 
Figure 8 reveals that the tax concentration curves for all categories of vegetables except “other” 
fresh vegetables lie above the Lorenz curve, and VAT on these categories of vegetables are 
therefore regressive. It can thus be concluded that the current zero-rating of VAT on frozen and 
“basic” fresh vegetables is appropriate. However, a VAT on canned vegetables are even more 
regressive as compared to frozen vegetables, whereas the impact of VAT on the category “other” 
fresh vegetables is progressive (its tax concentration curve mostly lies below the Lorenz curve, 
except for the richest 10% of the population). This implies that the benefit of zero-rating accrues 
to the richer households. These findings are accentuated in the Figure 9, which shows the 
percentage of households who had non-zero spending in each of the categories of vegetables. 
The percentage of households that spent non-zero amounts on “other” fresh vegetables more 
than doubled from quintile4 to quintile5. 
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Quintile1 Quintile2 Quintile3 Quintile4 Quintile5 All
Canned vegetables Frozen vegetables Basic fresh vegetables Other fresh vegetables
 
Source: Own calculations. Data from IES 2005/2006, Statistics South Africa, 2008. 
 
3.4.4 Indicator for measuring degree of tax burden on the poor   
 
A final method which confirms the results of the previous tax incidence analyses involves 
calculating indicators that measure the degree of the tax burden on the poor (Prasada, De Silva 
and Weerahewa, 2005). The calculation is done as follows:  
 
Tax burden on poorest 20% of population =  (Share of tax borne by poorest 20% as percentage 
of total tax collection / Share of income received by poorest 20% as percentage of total income 
earned by population)×100 
 
VAT paid by the poorest 20% of the population for each of the sub-categories (canned, frozen 
and fresh “basic” and “other” vegetables) is calculated as a percentage of the total VAT collected 
on that item. This is divided by the poorest 20%’s share of total income earned by the 
population. Prasada et al. (2005) state that if the indicator is above 100, the tax is regressive and if 
below 100, it is progressive. 
 
Table 4: Indicators 
Tax burden on poorest 20% of population Indicator Interpretation 
Frozen vegetables 484.9 regressive 
Canned vegetables 430.3 regressive 
Fresh “basic” vegetables 914.8 regressive 
Fresh “other” vegetables 095.1 progressive 
Source: Own calculations. Data from IES 2005/2006, Statistics South Africa, 2008. 
 
The results in Table 4 show that, for all the vegetable categories, the VAT burden indicator gives 
a value above 100, indicating regressivity.  What is significant for the purpose of this paper is that 
the indicator for canned vegetables is higher than the indicator for frozen vegetables. This once 
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again confirms previous findings that the impact of VAT on canned vegetables is more regressive 
than what it would be if the zero-rating were removed from frozen vegetables. This strengthens 
the case for the inclusion of canned vegetables and for the retention of frozen vegetables in the 
zero-rated basket of basic foodstuffs. A further argument in favour of this proposal emanates 
from Tait (1988:60). In his exposition on the difficulty of distinguishing between processed and 
unprocessed food, he argued that even though it seems desirable from an equity and nutritional 
standpoint to zero-rate fresh food, it is more than likely that canned and frozen food would be 
bought by working women and factory workers.16 Finally, the indicators for the sub-categories of 
fresh vegetables support earlier findings that the impact of VAT on “basic” fresh vegetables 
would be regressive, whereas on “other” fresh vegetables, it would be progressive. 
 
4.  CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS  
 
The economic incidence of VAT in South Africa, as well as the specific commodities that should 
be included in a basket of zero-rated foodstuffs to improve the regressive impact of the tax on 
the poor, are issues that have been extensively researched over the years. Although it is true that 
richer households benefit more from zero-rating in absolute terms, it is the relative position of 
the poor that is of the essence.  
 
The main focus of this paper related to the question whether zero-rating in South Africa is 
appropriately targeted. It accepts that zero-rating is not an optimal solution to the equity 
concerns of the tax, but that it is here to stay as part of a second-best solution given the socio-
political concerns and especially since the more direct social spending targets are not yet fully 
achieving the invisaged equity objectives. The study used the vegetable category as an example to 
illustrate that the targeting of zero-rated basic foodstuffs under VAT in South Africa could be 
improved. 
  
The study firstly analysed expenditure patterns of different income groups as well as the 
incidence of VAT on vegetables as specific food category in South Africa. The findings were that 
it is possible to divide a specific food category (such as fresh vegetables) into the sub-groups of 
“basic” versus “other”, and that the spending patterns on the basic category are distinctively 
different between rich and poor. This opens the door for a policy recommendation to levy the 
standard rate on “other” fresh vegetables and to keep the zero rating only on “basic” fresh 
vegetables. Some rough speculations on the tax revenue effects indicate a loss in revenue. 
However, in this case it is the poorest households that will benefit if these minor tax changes 
were to be implemented.  
 
It also found that the zero-rating of frozen vegetables was well targeted as frozen vegetables were 
consumed relatively more by poorer households. However, that the impact of VAT on canned 
vegetables was found to be more regressive than the possible impact should frozen vegetables be 
taxed. It is therefore recommended that canned vegetables should be included in the zero-rated 
basket of basic foodstuffs. It is an anomaly that canned vegetables are still not zero-rated, despite 
earlier requests and the fact that it is a product mostly consumed by relatively poorer households 
in the community.   
 
The findings of this study invite a more in-depth analysis of how appropriately zero-rating is 
applied to other food categories and suggest that such investigations must be done on a regular 
basis (as proposed by the Katz Commission (1994) and Cnossen (2003)), since even small 
changes to the tax treatment as proposed in this paper may affect the relative position of the 
poorest households in South Africa. A related matter that policymakers should consider (as 
mentioned by various studies) is whether the intended benefit from zero-rating is really 
                                                     
16 It should also be kept in mind that the South African tax authorities already apply zero-rating to canned fish (such 
as pilchards).   
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transferred to the end consumer and not absorbed earlier in the distribution chain. If the benefit 
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Table A.1: Classification of vegetable items 
Canned vegetables Frozen vegetables “Basic” fresh vegetables “Other” fresh vegetables Other vegetables 
Canned corn kernels 
Cream style sweet corn 
Baked beans in tomato source 
Tinned peas 
Butter beans 
Canned green beans 
Other canned vegetables 
Frozen cauliflower 
Frozen corn kernels 
Frozen green beans 
Frozen pumpkin 
Frozen peas 
Frozen mixed vegetables 
Other frozen vegetables 
Frozen carrots 
Frozen potato chips 
Fresh spinach/morogo 
Fresh cabbage 
Fresh green mealies 
Fresh tomatoes 
Fresh green beans 
Fresh pumpkin/butternut 
Fresh green/red/yellow pepper 
Fresh chillies 










Fresh gem squashes 
Fresh cucumber 












Pop corn kernels 
Prepared pop corn 
Vegetable spread 
Other vegetable products 
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